why are DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS so hard?


adeniseyu 21

deniseyu. io

A long time ago, in a datacenter not too far away...

#### A long time ago, in a datacenter not too far away...

All business applications talked to one database, usually hosted or



# A long time ago, in a datacenter not too far away...

All business applications talked to one database, usually hosted on





This worked for a while! Until IT stopped being Cost centers & started being business enablers.

Business analysis & data warehouses



Business analysis & data warehouses

transactions
where rabbits
under 40
bought 3
or more
carrots...

ML & Natural language processing




Business analysis & data warehouses

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ML & Natural language processing



Faster, bigger queries!



#### So we scaled vertically...




#### So we scaled vertically...



until unit economics (or physics) caught up.






Scalability:

one machine cannot
handle request or

data size




Scalability:

one machine (annot handle request or data size



Availability:
if one machine goes
down, others keep
working



Scalability:

one machine cannot
handle request or
data size



Availability:
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Latency:
go faster when
data is stored
geographically closer
to users

@deniseyu21 03

You may have heard the term "shared nothing" architecture:



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
This is mostly sensible, but it does force design trade-offs.



what does it actually mean to run a system?


DISTRIBUTED VS. multiple address Spaces, maybe Recipient details un might be unknown a note on Jim WALDO Geoff Wyant Computing San Kendali SUN MICEOSYSTEMS!

















#### The Byzantine Generals Problem






There are lots we can't know. But in distributed computing, we can know one thing:




There are lots we can't know. But in distributed computing, we can know one thing:


Shit's gonna fail




@deniseru2103




@ Principles of Computing Conf








"Does choosing consistency and availability (CA) as the "2 of 3" make sense? As some researchers correctly point out, exactly what it means to forfeit P is unclear."



Eric Brewer, CAP Twelve Years Later: How the 'Rules' Have Changed





# IS FOR LINEARIZABILITY



# IS FOR LINEARIZABILITY

to first cat. state = 'hungry'

t, cat. state = 'full'




# IS FOR LINEARIZABILITY


to find cat. state = 'hungry'


t, cat. state = 'full'

All nodes must have t, if anyone showed t,



All nodes must have t, if anyone showed t, This is really hard! Instant & universal replication.





Unavailable

Not available during some types of network failures. Some or all nodes must pause operations in order to ensure safety.

Sticky Available

Available on every non-faulty node, so long as clients only talk to the same servers, instead of switching to new ones.

Total Available

Available on every non-faulty node, even when the network is completely down.




## IS FOR AVAILABILITY





## IS FOR AVAILABILITY



We tend to think of availability as a binary state. But - reality is much messier!

Because LATENCY


How can we know if a node is unresponsive...
or just slow?



Network latency wasn't part of the original CAP formulation.

# Determining a timeout limit

is a very scientific process





## IS FOR PARTITION TOLERANCE

Network partitions occur when network connectivity between two datacenters (running your nodes!) is interrupted

## 15 FOR PARTITION TOLERANCE

During a partition, your nodes might as well be on opposite sides of a wormhole: there is no way to know what's happening on the other side.






#### PROOF OF CAP THEOREM



#### PROOF OF CAP THEOREM



OPTION 1

Let clients keep R/W in both sides of split



#### PROOF OF CAP THEOREM



OPTION 1

Let clients keep R/W in both sides of split

X LINEARIZABILITY

OPTION 2

Stop writing in one side until partition ends


XAVAILABILITY


@deniseyu2103


Network partitions are inevitable.

How inevitable?

In the first year of a Google cluster's life, it will experience 5 rack failures 3 router failures 8 network maintenances (Jeffrey Dean)







Network Cables fail



POLICY —

### It's official: Sharks no longer a threat to subsea Internet cables

First known cable shark attacks were in 1985.

DAVID KRAVETS - 7/10/2015, 5:16 PM

Software will behave weirdly

#### Software will behave weirdly

"Busky" UMs borrow resources from each other-ROINY! the NOISY Neighbor

#### Software will behave weirdly



@deniseyu21 3


## Network glitches



why does any of this matter?

Some part of every system is always at risk of failing susan stopped texting back let's get food without her

Fischer Tynch Paterson Correctness



"Impossibility of Distributed Consensus with One Faulty Process, 1985.

to manage uncertainty, we have Mitigation Strategies

# make rules for how many "yes" votes is enough to proceed




@deniseyu21 with @mt 165

What is even harder than getting machines to agree.

#### OBSFRUARILITY

"Systems are getting more complicated, mental models are getting tougher to build, and we're all distributed systems engineers now."

#### Charity Majors (@mipsytipsy)




Mumans

how do we manage? growing complexity? understand where complexity comes from

### woods theorem: as the complexity of a system increases, the accuracy of any single agent's own model of that system decreases rapidly. "Coping With Complexity: the psychology of human behavior in complex systems. " Dr. David Woods, 1988.


## BUILDING MENTAL MODELS

in theory:



# BUILDING MENTAL MODELS

in theory: in practice:





# INCIDENT ANALYSIS



is particularly great for mental model calibration

@deniseru21 3



Art created for zine.incidentlabs.io



Blameless discussions optimized for learning Don't accept Human Error as the root cause. Dig deeper!




#### Unintuitive design?

do not not not not not not not not not wish to receive emails

#### Unintuitive design?


do not not not not not not not not not wish to receive emails




Alert fatigue?


#### Unintuitive design?

do not not not not not not not not not wish to receive emails



Alevt fatigue? Not understanding the users' assumptions and needs?






Does the root cause even exist?


"The more we depend on technology and push it to its limits, the more we need highlyskilled, well-trained, wellpracticed people to make systems resilient, acting as the last line of defence against the failures that will inevitably occur."

Baxter, Rooksby, Wong, Khajeh-Hosseini "The Ironies of Automation... still going strong at 30?" (2012)



# we borrow against inherent complexity


but we can learn and adapt




Challenge yourself to empathize with each user

@deniseyu21 3

Our design choices Should make life Simpler for the humans operating our systems



we owe it to our end users & our teams to understand & design for the whole system



including the fleshy human parts.

Thanks!

